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This article is a preliminary and exploratory examination of three dis-
tinct traditions of intellectual production in Somalia: the Western secu-
lar tradition, the Islamic religious tradition, and the indigenous Somali 
poetic tradition. Historians who seek to reconstruct Somalia’s past 
have found valuable knowledge in the products of each of these tradi-
tions, and analysts of contemporary Somalia have argued that Somalis 
must draw on the wisdom and experience of all three if they hope to 
escape from their current national crisis. Unfortunately, most scholars 
of Somali Studies (myself included) draw their assumptions, pursue 
evidence, and conduct their research from within only one, or at most 
two, of these intellectual traditions. As a consequence, our understand-
ing of Somalia has been limited by the fragmentation of knowledge as 
it is produced, transmitted, and received by successive generations of 
Somali Studies students and scholars.
This partition of knowledge and understanding can be seen very 
clearly in the discordant narratives of history and identity that have 
surfaced during the past two decades of civil war in the Horn of Africa. 
Yet it has been operative, I would argue, for much longer in both aca-
demic and popular intellectual circles. It therefore seems worthwhile 
to examine the character of each of these three distinct knowledge 
systems and the historical circumstances that kept them separated, or 
partitioned, over the course of the past century. We can then reflect on 
the consequences for understanding contemporary Somalia.
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I. The Partition of the Horn and of Western Knowledge
The Scramble for Africa not only divided the Somali peninsula into 
five different territories, it also resulted in an intellectual partition of 
the region. As the partition initiated the process of creating separate 
colonial identities for each of the Somali colonial territories, Western 
scholars working in three different European languages and academic 
traditions began to produce the knowledge base that would become 
the foundation of the Western secular tradition of Somali Studies. As 
a result, the Somali population became both “subjects” of different 
colonial states and “objects” of study by different colonial researchers. 
Within each Somali territory, virtually all research was conducted by 
nationals of the colonizing power. Only rarely did visiting journal-
ists or explorers from other European countries publish significant 
writings about Somali life in those colonies. As a result, early Western 
scholarship on Somali history and society was partitioned. Colonial 
administrators, ethnographers, and experts proceeded to write about 
“their own” (i.e., British, Italian, French) Somalis.
It is worth noting that the production of knowledge about Soma-
lia was not always so fragmented. Prior to the European partition of 
Africa, the “discovery” of African peoples and cultures, and the pro-
duction of knowledge about them, had been a multi-national Western 
enterprise. Over the course of the nineteenth century, for example, the 
Somalilands were visited and described by German, Italian, French, 
British, and Eastern European travelers, each of whom contributed 
to the cumulative Western understanding—or in some cases misun-
derstanding—of the Somalis. Despite their diverse assumptions and 
cultural predispositions, the cosmopolitan travelers of the nineteenth 
century frequently read and cited each other’s work. Over time they 
produced a composite portrait of the Somalis that quite reasonably 
saw them as a single people or ethnie, albeit divided into different clans 
or “tribes.” Modern-day Somali Studies has seen a return to multi-
national scholarship on the region, but there are still residual traces of 
the national colonial scholarly traditions, and Somali Studies scholars 
working in Italy or France are not always widely read by those work-
ing in English-speaking countries.
The consequences of this intellectual partition of research were pro-
found. Not only did colonial-era writers (with a few notable excep-
tions) work almost exclusively within their own languages and depend 
upon sources (administrative reports, fact-finding missions, ethnogra-
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phies) produced by their co-nationals, but their Somali counterparts—
interpreters, civil servants, policemen and soldiers, students—also 
inherited those habits, working with the imperial language of their 
particular rulers. Even today, most foreign scholars of Somalia have 
tended to work with colonial records and historical documents pro-
duced within one, or at most two, of these colonial literary corpuses. 
Western-educated Somalis—including many of those currently pro-
ducing important scholarship—typically find themselves in the same 
situation, unable to work with valuable archival records about their 
own people because the records are in French, or Italian, or English.
Apart from this linguistic partition of knowledge, there were sub-
stantive differences in the subjects that colonial scholars chose to inves-
tigate. Researchers in French, British, and Italian Somaliland asked 
different questions and found different answers. For example, the Ital-
ians produced several very valuable studies of land tenure systems 
and of the formation of multi-clan communities in the riverine areas 
of their colony,1 but to my knowledge, British officials published noth-
ing similar in their Protectorate, even for the farming districts around 
Boraama. We have studies of grazing patterns and pasture reserves 
in the British Protectorate records,2 but nothing similar for the vast 
pastoral areas of Hiran and trans-Juba, which were governed by the 
Italians. Naturally, as one would expect, published writings on Somalis 
during the colonial era reflected the imperial objectives of each admin-
istration: agricultural development in Italian Somalia, the management 
of livestock resources for export in the British Protectorate, and the 
facilitation of Red Sea trade for French Somaliland. Nonetheless, the 
focus on these agendas shaped future scholars’ understanding of the 
distinctiveness of each colony because colonial writings became the 
primary sources and helped frame the central questions that subse-
quent generations of foreign and Somali scholars would pursue. When 
coupled with different educational systems, civil service practices, and 
forms of military recruitment and training, these colonial traditions of 
knowledge production resulted in a fragmented “official” record of 
Somali society and history.3
The partition of colonial knowledge about Somalia may be more 
than simply an inconvenience for contemporary scholars working in 
the Western tradition. It almost certainly hindered Somalis from con-
structing a coherent secular national ideology in the era of indepen-
dence movements, which in the Somalilands as elsewhere drew heavily 
on imported Western ideas of citizenship and state. The absence of 
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a shared pool of colonial knowledge—like the absence of a common 
colonial language and educational system—meant that post-World 
War II Somali nationalists tended to rely more heavily on regional 
identities (and on their shared Islamic heritage) to mobilize political 
support than was the case in many other African countries. It meant 
that the process of constructing a Somali national consciousness had to 
confront the additional challenge of a multi-centered colonialism and a 
fragmented political/intellectual milieu.
We still need serious research to determine whether the different 
colonial heritages of the partitioned Horn limited the process of nation 
building in the years leading up to independence. It may be that differ-
ent colonial intellectual traditions (ideas about governance, education, 
the role of law and religion in public life, etc.) affected the capacity of 
Somali leaders to work together effectively in a Western-style parlia-
mentary system. We can also ask if the distinctions between “hierarchi-
cal” agro-pastoral societies in the south and “pastoral democracies” 
in the north genuinely separated the political cultures of each region 
or were these distinctions primarily the product of colonial categories 
and scholarship that Somali intellectuals internalized? We know that 
the pan-Somali idea, which became a prominent part of the platform 
of the Somali Youth League and other parties in the 1940s, had been 
stimulated in part by the Italian Fascist project for a “Grande Soma-
lia” in the 1930s and by British Foreign Secretary Bevin’s proposal to 
create a Greater Somalia after World War II. But is it possible that the 
persistence of the irredentist idea in Somali public discourse from 1943 
onward can be explained partly by the absence of any other secular 
nationalist ideology capable of mobilizing Somali anti-colonial senti-
ments across the divided peninsula? Might pan-Somalism have been a 
substitute, so to speak, for a territorial nationalism built in response to 
a shared colonial heritage?
II. Islamic Knowledge and Somali National Consciousness
The knowledge produced by colonial and foreign scholars and by 
Western-educated Somalis represented only one intellectual tradition 
in the Horn. There is an even longer tradition of Arabic writing on 
Somalia,4 which saw the Somalis as part of the umma (community 
of believers) and wrote them into the universal history of Islam. In 
fact, it appears that Muslim scholars and sheikhs were instrumental 
in constructing the genealogies that connected virtually all Somalis 
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in the Horn to one of two common ancestors, a major contribution to 
the notion of a single Somali nation and, in one sense, a forerunner of 
modern pan-Somalism.5 Though the precise mechanisms by which 
Somalis living in different regions of the Horn came to see themselves 
as part of a larger whole are unclear, we can speculate about what hap-
pened from circumstantial evidence.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, intellectual currents of 
religious reform from the wider Islamic world had reached the literate 
Muslims in the coastal towns of Somalia. Notions of an umma in need 
of spiritual renewal were percolating throughout the region, and their 
proponents viewed Somalis collectively as Muslims ripe for reform. 
For the pious, Somalis were first and foremost Muslims, whatever their 
clan affiliations, and Islamic discourse saw clans as vehicles to spread 
the faith.6 At the same time, major population movements and political 
realignments in the Horn of Africa had intensified local conflicts over 
land and resources, and the task of mediating these conflicts typically 
fell to men of religion.7 We can infer that the convergence of these two 
processes began to transform the intellectual outlook of at least some 
Somalis. Those who had traveled abroad for education or pilgrimage 
began to “re-imagine” the different clan communities of the peninsula 
as members of a more inclusive umma, while local sheikhs literate in 
Arabic were the first to record in writing the genealogies of the clans 
among whom they lived and worked. At the same time, the expansion 
of Sufi orders (turuq) helped further the identification of local Soma-
lis with their co-religionists elsewhere in the peninsula and beyond.8 
This trend was most dramatically seen in the dervish movement of 
Maxammad Cabdille Xasan, who used Islamic appeals in an effort to 
unite his countrymen against the infidels. It is also evident in the more 
peaceful proselytism of Sheikh Aweys and other Sufis who sought to 
implement their own versions of Somali solidarity in an Islamic frame-
work. These Muslim intellectuals lived and worked in circumstances 
in which Somali society was in considerable flux, and they provided 
conceptual maps to help members of those societies navigate changing 
social, political, and religious relations, adding to the local xeer in the 
process.9
While the process of forging a more inclusive Somali genealogy 
appears to have begun well before the onset of European rule, colonial 
authorities built upon the work of these earlier Muslim genealogists. 
The first generation of European administrators and ethnographers 
set to work collecting the written genealogies that literate Muslims 
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had produced. By the 1910s, British and Italian officials had effectively 
confirmed the idea that the Somalis constituted a single ethnic group, 
even if they resided in different colonies. This chronology suggests 
that the amalgamation of local genealogies into a coherent “total gene-
alogy” was the joint product of Muslim intellectuals and early colonial 
administrators, mediated by those local Somali informants who were 
consulted in the process.10
During the colonial era, Muslim scholars, both Somali and Arab, 
continued to write for their own audiences on subjects ranging from 
how to live under infidel governments to histories of saints and schools 
of learning. Some religious writers were encouraged and even subsi-
dized by the colonial authorities. Several became ardent spokesmen 
for Somali national independence in the 1940s and 1950s.11 Though 
typically ignored by European colonial experts and neglected by later 
generations of foreign scholars (including Western-educated Somalis), 
Islamic discourses provided a continual thread of social commentary, 
an alternative voice on governance and public morality.
One reason that the Islamic voice has been relatively silent in the 
historiography of Somalia is that much of its discourse took place in 
Islamic schools and mosques, or at pilgrimage sites around the tombs 
of deceased saints. These sites were not readily accessible to European 
authorities, who in any event had little interest in them as long as Mus-
lim intellectuals stayed out of politics. Scholars of Islam have recently 
begun to pay attention to the “spaces” that Muslims carved out for 
themselves under European colonial rule, often with the tacit support 
of the authorities. Lamin Sanneh, for example, has noted how Islamic 
schools, Shari’a courts, and the Islamic press flourished under British 
rule in northern Nigeria, partly because the authorities ignored them, 
but also because they tacitly recognized Islamic institutions as positive 
influences for the establishment of security, literacy, administration, 
public charity, and the rule of law.12 Cheikh Anta Babou, my colleague 
at the University of Pennsylvania, has recently shown a similar pro-
cess at work in colonial Senegal, where the founder of the Muridiyya 
Order, Sheikh Amadu Bamba, systematically created “sacred” spaces 
for the instruction, employment, and service of his adepts, keeping 
both the French colonial authorities and the traditional Wolof royal 
elite at arm’s length so they would not “corrupt” the Muslims under 
his authority.13
One consequence in the Somalilands of this modus vivendi between 
the colonial authorities and moderate Islamic leaders was to enable a 
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Muslim civil society to develop. Under the umbrella of colonial secu-
lar administrations, Islamic schools, Shari’a courts, and agricultural 
cooperatives (jamaacooyiin) flourished. Objections to infidel rule were 
for the most part peaceful and confined to Muslim circles. However, as 
independence approached, many of these Islamic intellectual currents 
joined the public discourse over Somalia’s future. Lively debates over 
the official Somali script (in the 1950s and again after independence), 
the role of Islamic law in the Somali constitution, and, later, Siyaad 
Barre’s Family Law brought religious convictions out into the public 
political arena. At these moments, historians can detect the existence 
of strong religious sentiments fortified by an elaborate intellectual tra-
dition. When the Somali state collapsed, these long-gestating Islamic 
discourses bubbled to the surface once again.
A great deal of research remains to be done on the evolution of 
Somali Islamic thought and practice during the late colonial and early 
independence eras, when the “partnership” between religious authori-
ties and the state began to erode. Clearly the capacity of Muslim 
preaching to challenge state policies has been a constant thread in the 
20th-century history of Somalia. But that was not the only purpose of 
religiously based scholarship and commentary. If we think of Islamic 
intellectual and associational life solely as forms of resistance to Euro-
pean colonial rule, we deprive them of a creative and autonomous 
history of their own. We fail to appreciate Islamic knowledge as an 
independent stream of creative ideas and engaged commentary on the 
state of affairs—that is, as a distinct source of knowledge production 
whose antecedents date back well before the European era.
III. The Oral Poetic Tradition
The tradition of oral poetry (and other types of Somali oral literature) 
constitutes a third important stream of intellectual production and 
discourse. For Somalis, poetry is not only a cherished form of artistic 
expression and popular entertainment, it is also a major vehicle for 
social commentary on events of interest to the community. Poetic dis-
course seems to intensify in times of unrest or dramatic societal change, 
when the public has much to discuss and debate. Historians have long 
noted, for example, the explosion in poetic production which accom-
panied the dervish wars and their aftermath (1900–1930), as Maxam-
mad Cabdille Xasan sought to rally Somalis against colonial invasion 
or as he and his local rivals exchanged often brilliant poetic insults and 
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diatribes. We can also point to the popular poetic songs (heello) that 
emerged as urbanization began to impinge upon Somali consciousness 
in the 1940s and 1950s and to the poetic criticism produced by disillu-
sioned intellectuals following Somalia’s independence in the 1960s.14 In 
each of these eras, the poets liked to contrast older values and ways of 
behavior with the troubling new circumstances they saw around them. 
They frequently spoke metaphorically of the “end of the world” as 
they knew it, and warned their listeners about the dangers of abandon-
ing the old ways.
With its capacity to capture the popular mood and to shape public 
opinion, Somali oral poetry can certainly be considered a major form 
of intellectual discourse. In fact, I would suggest that the poetic tradi-
tion, especially in its pre-1970 rural context, constituted a third stream 
of knowledge production in Somalia, with a different audience and 
different set of objectives than Western and Islamic discourses. Poetry 
offers scholars an alternative reading of many events in Somali history. 
Even after the introduction of recording technologies in the 1950s and 
the Internet in the 1990s, poetry remains a universally popular form of 
communication among Somalis, both at home and in the diaspora.
One way that the oral poetic tradition constitutes a set of alterna-
tive discourses on history and society can be seen in the poetic chains 
and oral commentaries on those chains.15 These extended exchanges 
or debates between poets from different clans or with varying points 
of view sometimes ran parallel to Western colonial debates, sometimes 
intersected with them, and not infrequently dealt with separate issues 
altogether. Very few foreigners were conversant with these poetic dis-
courses, in part because they unfolded in a language (Somali) and in a 
medium (alliterative oral poetry) that outsiders did not know, and in 
part because Somalis deliberately confined their commentaries within 
their own networks.
Recently, Lidwien Kapteijns and Maryan Omar Ali have shown how 
women’s oral poetry and songs constitute a distinctive and complex 
corpus of popular commentary that reflects many changes in Somali 
social life over the past century, even if they did not fundamentally 
challenge the patriarchal nature of Somali social relations.16 Jama 
Mohamed, on the other hand, uses oral poetry to reveal populist under-
currents in Somali thought that were not always evident in the writings 
or speeches of Somali political elites. In a series of articles on popular 
movements in the British Protectorate after World War II,17 Mohamed 
suggests that poets constituted “subaltern” voices, commenting on 
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society from the perspectives, for example, of drought-stricken herds-
men, impoverished urban migrants, or incarcerated freedom fighters. 
These dissident poets not only critiqued the abuses of the colonial sys-
tem but also frequently chastised Somalis for not taking advantage of 
opportunities to improve their living standards or incomes. Mohamed’s 
analysis suggests that in oral poetry we often find discourses that are 
disjoined from the written narratives of Somali history. Indeed, while 
most Western-educated Somalis appreciate their oral poetic tradition, 
its distinctive insights often fail to find their way into modern scholarly 
writings—perhaps because many of the best examples of Somali oral 
poetry express parochial or clan-based sentiments that are unpalat-
able to modern elites (both Western- and Islamic-educated), or because 
much of the classical poetry is too obscure for researchers to draw 
upon readily as source material. The result is yet another division in 
Somalia’s intellectual life, another “partition of knowledge.”
What can Somali Studies specialists learn from paying attention to 
oral poetic commentary? For one thing, we learn that many Somalis 
experienced the effects of early European rule only indirectly, in the 
form of inter- or intra-clan warfare, of increasing livestock raids, or of 
population displacements resulting from the arming of certain clans 
by the British or Italians to fight the dervishes. Much of the oral poetry 
composed in the 1910s, ’20s, and ’30s reflects shifting relations of power 
or territorial control between clans.18 Indeed, most Somali oral poetry 
before the nationalist era is not about Europeans at all, even in cases in 
which academic historians know that European expansion lay behind 
the conflicts. Poetry was a discourse that took place among Somalis, 
and as such, it gives us unique access to popular opinions about small 
and great events that mattered at the community level.
Somali oral poetry is also a good place to look for changes in his-
torical consciousness,19 as new subject matter, fresh genres, and newly-
coined words can be taken as evidence of changing Somali perceptions 
of the world around them. One can also find several historical exam-
ples of poetry that in hindsight appear prophetic of conflicts to come.20 
Yet even this grassroots intellectual tradition is limited as a tool for 
understanding the Somali condition. We need to remember that poetic 
narratives (considered collectively) contain the entire spectrum of opin-
ions that Somalis can hold on an issue; and because Somali oral poetic 
conventions are themselves quite conservative, they may be good for 
preserving and transmitting poems through several generations, but 
they make it harder to detect philosophical or ideological changes 
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in Somali worldviews. It is also important to realize that on many 
occasions throughout the 20th century, Somali poets—in their role as 
upholders of traditional values—used verse to bemoan the conditions 
of their society and to predict disaster if their listeners did not change 
their ways. This may be more of a poetic convention than a piece of 
evidence that the poet’s world had really changed.
Since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, poets have continued 
to compose verse both in the Horn and abroad. While at least one 
noted Somali scholar has recently lamented that the nation’s poetic tra-
dition has been grievously damaged by the past two decades of war,21 
others are more sanguine.22 Hopefully, young Somali scholars will take 
up the challenge of collecting a representative sample of this post-1991 
poetry and analyze its uses of the past, its sentiments toward nation 
and clan, and its overall literary merit. My sense is that some of the 
most popular poems (just as some of the most popular songs today) 
are those that lament the recent fate of the Somali nation and call for 
the restoration of Somali unity and pride. While nostalgia for the old 
days and appeals to keep the spirit of nationalism alive are typical of 
the sentiments found within diaspora communities everywhere in the 
world, in the Somali case we might also be seeing at work a continua-
tion of the poet’s role as social critic, reminding the audience of old vir-
tues that are in danger of being eroded and of leaders who are losing 
their way. Before 1990, poets frequently challenged the misuse of state 
power and the distortion of nationalist and pan-Somali ideologies by 
unscrupulous leaders. Now, with the collapse of the state and the prev-
alence of regional and clan narratives, many poets have become critics 
of fragmentation and parochialism, and champions of reunification.
Circumstances have changed; will the role of the poet as social critic 
change as well?
IV. Conclusion
Among the casualties of the Somali civil war are deep wounds to 
Somalis’ sense of unity and a shared national past. In the years since 
the demise of the central government, Somali politics has settled into 
a series of regional debates and claims for recognition by “minorities” 
and other marginalized communities. Over the past two decades, what 
has kept the idea of the Somali nation alive is the attention focused on 
the various “national” reconciliation conferences. These have served 
to sustain the idea that a strong state is essential for the renewal of 
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Somalia—not a bad idea, but one which tends to underestimate the 
deep levels of mistrust that many contemporary Somalis feel toward 
centralized power of any kind. To foreign observers like myself, it 
appears that the most vocal advocates for the return of a strong central 
government are those who would like to be in charge of it. There are 
also a handful of genuine nationalists writing from the diaspora with 
sentiments that may be widely shared by their fellow Somalis in the 
Horn but with scant capacity to implement their vision of a strong but 
drastically reformed state.
However, the alternative intellectual traditions whose voices West-
ern scholars have largely neglected also contain visions on which a 
restored national unity can be built. Somali Islamic intellectuals have 
contributed much to the building of a national consciousness, even 
if some of today’s more radical spokesmen appear to be abandoning 
Somali solidarity for religious orthodoxy. While many Somalis remain 
wary of “imported” Islamist ideas or skeptical of the Islamists’ claims 
to have left clan loyalties behind, they might well appreciate the long 
record of religious appeals for justice, public charity, and the rule of 
law that Somali Muslim intellectuals have delivered to their fellow citi-
zens over the past century.
Similarly, the “poet intellectuals” have long championed the values 
of fairness and accountability, using their verse to chastise leaders who 
crossed the line into hubris and authoritarianism. Indeed, it seems 
that Somali poets as a whole have retained the respect of the many 
audiences that now make up the Somali nation in the Horn and in the 
diaspora, even though some of them were discredited by their initial 
support of the Siyaad Barre regime. But poets have always been better 
critics of excess in the exercise of power than they have been architects 
of alternative political models; better at building consensus within their 
clans for local agendas than at building consensus around national 
goals; and even today, better at reminding their contemporaries of the 
virtues of national unity than they are at exposing the costs of that 
nationalism when it has turned to expansionism. It is also crucial to 
realize that neither the Islamic nor the oral-poetic tradition speak in the 
idioms of state and citizenship familiar to the international legal com-
munity. Consequently, they have appeared to international observers 
as incapable of filling the void created by the collapse of the colonial/
postcolonial political order.
In other words, each of these intellectual traditions remains incom-
plete in its diagnoses and prescriptions for today’s sick nation. Each 
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retains a sizable following and a certain intellectual vitality, which 
helps explain the absence of a shared Somali response to the crisis of 
the 1990s. These various interpretive traditions have served to under-
pin the variety of strategies that Somalis have adopted to help them 
cope with the immediate disruptions of war. They have also obstructed 
the emergence of even a medium-term strategy for rebuilding the 
state. There is simply no shared historical understanding of what a 
state should be or do. With the discrediting of the national narrative 
espoused by the Siyaad regime, the Islamists and the poets found 
ready audiences for their messages, but they have been unable to rally 
the entire nation behind their visions. They continue their parallel dis-
courses, but they are not yet in conversation with one another.
What is needed is a healthy dialogue (or “trialogue”) amongst the 
practitioners and partisans of these distinct intellectual traditions. Yet 
the segmentation of knowledge about Somalia has made it difficult for 
those operating within one of the paradigms to embrace the wisdom 
and insights of the others. I am not certain if there is a realistic way 
to unify this fragmented knowledge any more than there is a realistic 
solution to the problem of Somali political unification. Even if we as 
scholars can find ways to bridge the divides among Western, Islamic, 
and local Somali knowledge, it is not at all certain that politicians have 
the will or the capacity to follow suit. Yet we must at least continue the 
effort.
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